The field of marketing has witnessed substantial improvement in modeling household level heterogeneity. However, relatively little has been written about how modeling household heterogeneity translates into better marketing decisions. In this paper, we study the role of incorporating household heterogeneity in reference price effects on a retailer's pricing policy. In order to study the impact of heterogeneity in reference price effects on retail pricing we use a hierarchical Bayes nested logit model that provides estimates for gain and loss effects at the household level. By using household level estimates and a dynamic programming algorithm, we then develop a normative pricing policy for a retailer maximizing category profit.
INTRODUCTION
Over the last ten years, the field of marketing has witnessed substantial improvement in modeling household level heterogeneity. The progression from aggregate (e.g. Guadagni and Little 1981) to latent class (Kamakura and Russell 1989) to hierarchical Bayes (Allenby and Lenk 1994 ) models reflects the inroads we have made in characterizing household differences. While these methodological advances are commendable, relatively little has been written about the impact of modeling household heterogeneity on marketing decisions. In this paper, we demonstrate the pricing and category profit implications of incorporating heterogeneity in reference price effects for a retailer. We show that for an important marketing problem pertaining to a retailer, the optimal pricing decisions for various brands in a category are inextricably related to household heterogeneity in reference effects and brand preference.
A considerable amount of research exists on reference prices (see Kalyanaram and Winer 1995 for a review). Reference prices are certain anchors or standards that households use to compare the observed purchase price of a product against. If the observed price is greater than the reference price it is perceived as a "loss". On the other hand, if the observed price is less than the reference price it is perceived as a "gain". Empirical evidence regarding the relative impact of perceived gains and losses on household choice has been quite mixed. For example, Putler (1992) found that, consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) , the effect of a loss on demand is greater than that of an equal gain. Greenleaf (1995) , on the other hand, finds that the effect of a gain is greater than that of a loss.
While investigating the effects of reference price on household utility is of considerable theoretical interest, an equally interesting issue is the normative impact of these effects on a retailer's pricing policy. Some recent papers (Kopalle, Rao, and Assunção 1996, Greenleaf 1995) in marketing have studied the normative implications of reference price effects from the standpoint of a retailer. Kopalle et al.'s (1996) results suggest that when the impact of a price gain is greater than that of a loss, "hi/lo" prices are optimal; on the other hand, when the impact of a loss is greater than that of a gain, constant prices are optimal. This result is consistent with Greenleaf's (1995) monopoly analysis. A limitation of the above normative models is that they do not take into consideration household level heterogeneity in reference price effects.
As noted above, current normative research on reference prices suggests that at an aggregate level, when the impact of a gain is greater than that of a loss, the retailer should promote. However, uncovering heterogeneity is likely to reveal that not all households are the same with respect to the reference price effects (as well as brand preference and price response); for some, the impact of a loss may be larger than that of a gain and for others, the reverse may hold. Further, the magnitude of the gain and loss effects may also vary across households.
Under such (perhaps common) circumstances, it is not clear whether a retailer should price promote, and if so, which brands to promote. Therefore normative policies based on a model that does not account for heterogeneity could potentially result in a pricing policy that does not maximize retailer profits.
Also, from a methodological standpoint, recent empirical research suggests that it is important to formally consider heterogeneity in reference effects because aggregate models tend to overstate the magnitude of the model estimates. For example, Chang, Siddarth, and Weinberg (1999) use a hierarchical Bayes model to show that upon accounting for the price response heterogeneity, the sticker shock effect gets diminished. Similarly, Bell and Lattin (2000) use a latent class model to show that once the price response heterogeneity is taken into consideration, the impact of reference prices on choices that consumers make is reduced.
The primary focus of this paper is to study the role of household heterogeneity in reference price effects on normative pricing policies for the retailer. We use a hierarchical Bayes nested logit model that provides estimates for gain and loss effects at the household level. For the product category used in this paper, we find that although at the aggregate level, the impact of a loss is about the same of a corresponding gain, for a number of households the impact of a gain is greater than that of a corresponding loss. Based on our household level estimates, we develop normative pricing policies for a retailer maximizing category profit by simultaneously optimizing prices of various brands in the category. We find that the optimal pricing policies derived from the heterogeneous case are qualitatively different from the case when heterogeneity is ignored.
We suggest that when there is household heterogeneity in reference price effects, it is important for the retailer to (a) consider the joint distribution of gains and losses among the households and (b) promote brands that are highly preferred by the "gain seeking" households. We also show that a model that incorporates household heterogeneity in reference effects results in more profitable retailer pricing policy than one that does not.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide the conceptual background for our study and describe the relevant literature. This is followed by a description of the model and variables. We then present the empirical results. Next, optimal pricing policy implications for a retailer carrying multiple brands in a category are derived.
Finally, we provide a summary and discussion of our analysis.
BACKGROUND

Asymmetric Response to Price
It is argued that households are generally more reactive to price increases than to price decreases (Winer 1986 , 1989 , Monroe 1990 ). This phenomenon is consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) which predicts that households are more sensitive to a loss than to an equal gain. Such an asymmetric household response results in a kinked demand curve and the kink appears at the point where observed price is equal to the reference price (Hardie, Johnson, and Fader 1993, Putler 1992) . On the other hand, other empirical studies show differing results. For example, Briesch, Krishnamurthi, Mazumdar, and Raj (1997) show that the effect of a gain is greater than that of a corresponding loss in four different product categories. Greenleaf (1995) finds a similar effect in yet another category. In addition to the aggregate (i.e. no heterogeneity) empirical evidence cited above, some studies have examined the relative impact of gain and loss at a segment level. For example, Krishnamurthi, Mazumdar and Raj (1992) find that for one segment the impact of a gain on demand is greater than that of a corresponding loss. For another segment, they did not find a significant difference between gains and losses. Also, Mazumdar and Papatla (1995) find that the impact of gain is greater than a corresponding loss for a two-segment solution in the margarine category while the reverse is true in the liquid detergent category.
Based upon the above review of existing literature, empirical evidence for an asymmetric response to price appears to be quite mixed. Some studies show that effect of gain is stronger than a loss whereas others find the opposite. Taken together, the above studies highlight the need for accounting household heterogeneity in estimating the relative impact of gains and losses, especially if they were to guide a retailer's pricing policies.
Following Krishnamurthi et al.'s (1992) analysis of transaction utility (Thaler 1985) , we note that for some households, transaction utility may play a significant role in determining the total utility. As a result, perceived gain of obtaining a "deal" may be stronger than that of a corresponding loss. This notion is similar to Jeuland and Narasimhan's (1985) result that some households are more likely to buy during deal periods. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that at least for some households, the impact of a gain on demand should be greater than that of a corresponding loss. On the other hand, some households may exhibit typical loss aversion as suggested by prospect theory. As shown later, the existence of such heterogeneity with respect to gain and loss effects is indeed a key driver of optimal pricing policies for a retailer.
Reference Price Formation Process
Most studies in this area posit that households form reference prices based on prices encountered on previous purchase occasions. An exponential smoothing process is therefore commonly used to model the formation of reference prices (e.g., Chang et al. 1999 , Kalwani, Yim, Rinne, and Sogita 1990 , Kalyanaram and Little 1994 , Kopalle and Winer 1995 , Krishnamurthi et al. 1992 , Lattin and Bucklin 1989 , Rajendran and Tellis 1994 . Since reference price is based on household retrieval of past prices, such a conceptualization has also been referred to as internal (Mayhew and Winer 1992) or memory based (Rajendran and Tellis 1994 ) reference price. Based upon extensive comparisons involving multiple product categories, Briesch et al (1997) concluded that brand specific, exponentially smoothed internal reference prices resulted in the best fit to the data. Therefore we use the same conceptualization in this paper.
Retailer Pricing Policies
In general, prior work on the normative impact of reference price effects on pricing policies (Greenleaf 1995 , Kopalle and Winer 1996 , Kopalle et al. 1995 provides direction with regard to price promotion when the consumers are either "gain seeking" or "loss averse". This work suggests that a retailer should promote only when the impact of a gain is greater than that of a loss and a constant price is more profitable when the opposite is true. In a two-segment model, Kopalle et al. (1995) suggest that for all brands, hi/lo prices are more profitable than a constant price when the proportion of the segment for whom the effect of a gain is greater than a loss ("gain seeking") is high. However, they (a) do not recognize household level heterogeneity in general and in gain/loss effects in particular and (b) assume equal brand preference thus providing the same recommendations for all brands regardless of brand preference. Recognizing household heterogeneity (point (a) above) is important because the assumption of homogeneity within each segment is restrictive. Recent innovations in characterizing heterogeneity (see Wedel et al 1999 for a review) show that models that recognize household heterogeneity are conceptually more appealing and predictively more accurate. The limitation pertaining to brand preference in point (b) is particularly troubling as discussed next.
Prior research on pricing policies which assumes that consumer demand is a function of price and reference price only is restrictive because brand preference is also likely to impact consumer decision of whether and what to buy. An understanding of the joint impact of brand preference and reference price effects is critical because it may help the retailer make more profitable pricing decisions. Specifically, the manner in which both brand preference and reference price effects impact consumer demand is important because retailers typically manage multiple brands within a product category and therefore have to decide which brand(s) to promote. Based upon our current state of knowledge, therefore, in market situations where both "gain seeking" and "loss averse" consumers exist and brand preference varies across consumers, the optimal pricing policy is not well understood. Because not all households are alike and purchase incidence is more likely to be greatest when brands that are highly preferred are promoted (Baohong, Neslin, and Srinivasan 2000) , the normative implications for retailer pricing in the presence of household heterogeneity remain unclear. This gap in the literature suggests the need to develop a normative model for retailer pricing decisions that incorporates individual differences among all model parameters including the gain and loss effects.
There is some research in marketing that is instructive about the link between brand preference and promotion effectiveness. For example, extant studies suggest that households pay more attention to promotions on their preferred brands. Ortmeyer, Lattin, and Montgomery (1991) argue that a household's response to promotions on a brand increases with his/her preference for that brand. In addition, Celsi and Olson (1988) demonstrate that in categories such as household packaged goods, households pay little or no attention to promotions offered on less-preferred brands. Similarly, research in the context of coupon promotions also supports this general finding (Bawa and Shoemaker 1987, Neslin, Henderson and Quelch 1985) . Thus, the available empirical evidence suggests that price promotion is likely to be more profitable for brands that are preferred by the households.
Fusing the above empirical results with heterogeneous reference price effects where households vary with respect to gain and loss effects, we expect that the pricing policy of a retailer maximizing category profits would be affected by two considerations. First, there should be some households for whom the impact of a gain is greater (i.e. gain seeking) than that of a loss. Second, such "gain seeking" households prefer the brand to be promoted. It therefore becomes necessary to first model heterogeneity in consumer preferences and gain/loss effects and then use the available individual estimates to evaluate a retailer's profit function to assess promotion effectiveness. We propose that in order to determine whether a retailer should promote a given brand, the retailer needs to ensure that some proportion of households are "gainseeking" and that the brand has a high preference among the gain-seekers.
In the next section we present a hierarchical Bayes model of consumer choice and purchase incidence that provides individual estimates of brand preference and gain/loss effects.
We then present a dynamic programming approach that uses these individual estimates to assess retailer profitability for a price promotion decision.
MODEL
Household Level Parameters and Estimation
We use a nested logit framework to model brand choice and purchase incidence. In this formulation, the unconditional probability of a given household purchasing brand j on occasion t is given by,
Conditional on a purchase (B=1) incidence, the choice probability is given by,
The deterministic part of the utility function is given by,
where β j and β p capture the brand preference and price sensitivity of the household. Consistent with previous research on reference prices (Winer 1986 , Breish et al 1997 the model assumes that a household experiences a gain when a brand's price is below their reference price (r jt > p jt ) and a loss when the price exceeds reference price (r jt > p jt ). Correspondingly, β g and β l capture the household's sensitivity to such gains and losses. Notice that for logical consistency, both β g and β l should be ≥ 0. As is commonly done (e.g. Dillon and Gupta 1996, Arora, Allenby and Ginter 1999 ; also see Boatright, McCulloch and Rossi 1999) , this is accomplished by reparameterizing β g as exp(γ) and β l as exp(λ) and estimating γ and λ instead.
The purchase incidence probability in our model is given by,
As seen the next section, we include purchase incidence in the model so that the optimal retail prices are bounded. In the above model specification, the parameter vector (θ) for the given household contains the following elements:
Heterogeneity across the respondents (i=1,…,N) for the model parameters is captured by the following random effects specification: Bayes model offers conceptual advantages over the latent class approach because it does a better job of characterizing individuals residing in the tails of the distribution of heterogeneity (Allenby and Ginter 1995; Arora, Allenby and Ginter 1998) . For the purpose of our paper, as noted earlier, it is important to be able to accurately characterize households that are highly "gain seeking" and have a strong brand preference.
The model is estimated by the Gibbs sampler (Gelfand and Smith 1990) , which used simulated draws from the full conditional distribution of model parameters in order to estimate the model. Use of the Gibbs sampler requires full conditional distributions of all the model parameters to be estimated. Details are provided in the technical appendix.
Reference Price Operationalization
We operationalize the reference price assuming a memory based, exponentially smoothed process. In this specification, reference price is a weighted average of past prices such that the more recent prices are weighted higher. If r t and p t be the reference price and observed price for a brand in time t then according to the exponential smoothing process,
Note that reference price, r t , becomes increasingly dependent on less recent prices as π  increases.
OPTIMAL PRICING POLICY FOR A RETAILER
We consider the case of a retailer managing multiple brands. Following prior analyses of price promotions (Greenleaf 1995 , Tellis and Zufryden 1995 , we use prices over time as the control variables. Based on equations (2)- (4), for a given set of parameters for each of the N households, the demand for brand j in period t is given by, 
where CV jt is given by Equation (4) and u jit is given by Equation (3).
As indicated earlier in Equations (3) and (6) p jt denotes price of brand j in period t and the reference price of brand j in period t, r jt , is an exponentially smoothed average of past prices.
The retailer maximizes category profit by maximizing the sum of discounted profits over time and across brands by selecting a sequence of prices over time for each brand. Thus, the retailer's objective function is given by:
where δ is the discount rate, FC is fixed cost, c is unit variable cost (i.e., the price at which the retailer buys from the manufacturer), and S represents retail sales and is given by Equation (7).
Without loss of generality, we assume that the profit is rescaled in such a way that the fixed cost is zero. The variable cost to the retailer is kept constant over time for all the brands but at different levels for different brands. The retailer's constant variable cost for a brand is computed using the average price for that brand during the time horizon considered, and a margin of 40% (Dhar and Hoch 1996 , Kopalle, Mela, Marsh 1999 , Tellis and Zufryden 1995 
The existence and uniqueness of the solution to the above problem with and without discounting is shown in Bertsekas (1987, Chapters 5 and 7). Using Bellman's (1957) principle of optimality we can solve the problem indicated by Equations (8) and (9) to determine the optimal retailer price for brands j = 1,...,m, over time for a given cost to the retailer.
The dynamic programming algorithm is solved using backward induction and interpolation. Future reference prices for each brand are truncated at the first decimal place and future maximal profits are then retrieved using interpolation. In any such optimization, transient effects are encountered at the beginning and at the end of the time horizon that should be removed. We consider a time horizon of T periods. 
where CV jt is given by Equation (4) and u jit is given by Equation (3). Further, r it+1 = πr it + (1-π)
Finally, we know that V(T)(r 1T ,r 2T ,...,r mT ) = 0, and T is known. Thus, using a grid search we first solve for the optimal prices, p iT , i=1,2,...,m, for period T, for each combination of values for the reference prices for the m brands at the beginning of last period T, i.e., r 1T , r 2T ,..., r mT . We then proceed backward to time, T-1, and determine p iT-1 , i=1,2,...,m, by maximizing Equation (10) given a set of reference prices at the beginning of Period T-1. Future reference prices for each brand are computed and` the corresponding future maximal profits are recalled accordingly. This is repeated for all combinations of r iT-1 , i=1,2,...,m. The backward induction algorithm continues until we reach Period 1, where r i1 , j = 1,...,m are known. The optimal price path is then obtained by forward enumeration of reference prices in each period (using r it = αr it-1
..,m) and picking the corresponding optimal prices in each period. In the empirical section that follows, posterior means were used as household parameter estimates to evaluate equations 7-10.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Data
Scanner-panel data for margarine (16 oz. size) obtained from a large grocery store in a metropolitan city between 1991-93 is used. Panelists with at least five (5) purchase incidents over the two-year period were included in the analysis. This resulted in a total of 5214 shopping trips, 625 purchase occasions in the margarine category and 67 panelists. Because the model includes both choice and incidence we felt that a household should have made at least five purchases during the two-year period for it to be included in the analyses. This is a subjective criterion and could be easily changed in order to increase the number of panelists. We consider eight brands in the category -together they account for over 90% of the margarine sales. Table 1 About Here] estimates is exp(-1.97)=0.14 and exp(-1.83)=0.16, respectively. In spite of taking into consideration price response heterogeneity, we find that the gain and loss coefficients are noticeably different from zero. Finally, parameter estimates corresponding to the purchase incidence part of the model namely, the intercept and the category value, are significant. At the aggregate level, the estimates therefore appear to be reasonable and have face validity.
Estimation Results
[Insert
Diagonal elements of the covariance matrix in Table 1 provide evidence for the existence of large heterogeneity. For example, the variance term corresponding to the preference for brand 2 ( 2 σ =26.12) suggests that while at the aggregate there is a positive preference for this brand ( 2 β =1.62), households residing in the lower tail of this distribution (and therefore do not like
Brand 2) also exist.
[Insert Figure 1 About Here]
Interestingly, although at the aggregate level we find that the impact of a loss is about the same as that of a gain, there exist a considerable number (43%) of households for whom the impact of a gain is greater than that of a loss. Figure 1 provides a plot of how the gain and loss parameters are distributed across the households. It is the existence of such a distribution that makes it unclear whether a retailer should promote and if so, which brands should it promote. In the next section, we examine normative implications of our estimates on retailer pricing policy.
NORMATIVE MODEL RESULTS
We consider a time horizon of 26 weeks and analyze the pricing policy in the middle 10 periods to remove any transient effects at the beginning and at the end of the time horizon. This is a standard approach in all simulations where optimal steady state policies are sought. Based upon the market share criterion, the top five brands (Brands 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6) that account for over 70% of the sales were included in this analysis. Our goal was to obtain the most profitable pricing for these five brands. The prices for the remaining three brands were kept constant.
Because the optimization program is computer memory intensive (for example, when we considered all 8 brands for analysis, our mainframe computer ran out of memory), we limited the search for optimal prices to five brands. This, however, does not affect the generality of our findings. The dynamic programming algorithm is solved using backward induction. Given the time horizon considered, we set the discount factor, δ, at 1.0.
Base Case Results -No Heterogeneity
Existing research relies on aggregate estimates to obtain the optimal pricing strategy for a retailer. We begin our investigation by first obtaining the optimal pricing strategy by using the mean estimates reported in Table 1 . By doing so we ignore the heterogeneity across households and the information contained in the covariance matrix estimates. Figure 2 shows the optimal pricing strategy for a retailer when heterogeneity is ignored. Note that the aggregate estimates (see Table 1 ) indicate that the loss and gain coefficients are not different. The results for this case suggest a constant optimal price for all five brands. This is consistent with prior optimal pricing models in the reference price area (Greenleaf 1995 . Brands 2 and 6
should be priced at $1.25, brand 3 at $1.20 and brands 1 and 4 at $1.15.
[Insert Figure 2 About Here]
Prior research indicates that the when the impact of a loss is greater than or equal to that of a corresponding gain, constant prices are optimal. Given a constant unit cost c, when the effect of losses is higher than that of corresponding gains, the demand with a pricing policy of p * + ε and p * -ε in two consecutive periods is lower than that would be obtained if price is constant at p * in both periods. The rationale is following. Consider the case of a one period memory. In a two period hi-low pricing cycle (say, low price in Period 1 and high price in Period 2), the reference price in Period 1 will be higher than the price and the net increase in utility due to the reference price effect increases with γ(r-p). Similarly the reference price in Period 2 will be lower than the price and the net decrease in utility due to the reference price effect for a brand will be λ(r-p). The total utility in the two periods due to the reference effect is (r-p)(δ-γ) < 0, since γ > δ; this thus decreases the probability of purchase of the brand under consideration.
Although we have ignored the main effect of price, the above argument holds even when we include the main price effect. Because the corresponding total profit would be lower in the case of a two period cycle, a constant price is optimal.
Results After Incorporating Heterogeneity
An advantage of the hierarchical Bayes model used is that it provides individual level estimates. Next, we use individual level estimates to derive the normative pricing results in the heterogeneous case. Interestingly, although on average, the impact of a loss is about the same as that of a corresponding gain, we find that for many customers the impact of a gain is greater than that of a loss. The normative pricing policies for the five major brands considered are given in Figure 3 . We find that for the Brands 1, 3, and 4 constant prices are optimal. On the other hand,
for Brands 2 and 6 hi-low prices are optimal (the corresponding sales show a similar pattern, i.e., higher sales when a brand is on promotion and vice versa).
[Insert Figure 3 About Here]
Prior normative results in the reference price literature suggest that the optimal pricing policy depends on whether the impact of a gain is greater than that of a loss and does not take into consideration (a) household level heterogeneity and (b) how the gain/loss effects interact with brand preference. Our analysis in Section 2 suggests that when there exist a sufficient number of people for whom the gain coefficient is greater than the loss coefficient, it is optimal for the retailer to promote those brands for which the brand preference is high among those "gain-seeking" households. We find this to be the case for brands 2 and 6. To investigate the relationship between brand preference and the gain coefficient further, we identify those households for whom the gain coefficient is greater than the loss coefficient. Table 2 compares the brand preference of these "gain seekers" (gain coefficient > loss coefficient) with the "loss aversive" (gain coefficient < loss coefficient) households. As indicated earlier 43% of the households have a gain coefficient greater than the loss coefficient. Note that these 43%
households have a very strong preference for Brands 2 and 6 compared to the rest. This analysis shows that from the standpoint of retailer profitability, in the presence of a significant number of households who are loss-averse, the "gain seeking" households have to prefer a brand for price promotion to work. Our results therefore suggest that when there is household heterogeneity with respect to gain and loss effects, retailers should promote brands for which the preference is high among the households who value gains more than losses.
[Insert Table 2 About Here]
[Insert Figure 4 About Here]
Next we explore the optimal pricing strategy for segments in the marketplace. Two separate segments namely the "gain seeking" and "loss averse" are studied. Note that we recognize with-in segment heterogeneity in the following analysis because each household has unique parameter estimates. Figure 4 shows the optimal pricing policy for the "gain seeking" segment and suggests promoting all five major brands. Note that, akin to Rossi, McCulloch and Allenby (1996) , it may be feasible to mail targeted coupons to the "gain seeking" households in order to implement such a price promotion strategy. More generally, Figure 4 shows that for product markets and categories involving primarily "gain seeking" households, promoting all brands appears to be profitable for the retailer. As expected, for the "loss averse" segment, we find that constant prices are optimal for all the five major brands.
Finally, we compared the retailer's category profits over 10 periods in the no heterogeneity case versus the heterogeneity case. The results show that the total profit in the heterogeneity case (Figure 3 ) was 81% higher than the case when we do not take heterogeneity into consideration (Figure 2 ). Our empirical analyses therefore suggest that incorporating heterogeneity in reference price effects leads to a very different optimal pricing policy and a higher category profit for the retailer. We also note that the average per period category purchase incidence goes up from 8% to 12.7% when no heterogeneity is considered in the pricing policy versus when household heterogeneity is considered in the pricing policy.
DISCUSSION
We have witnessed some exciting innovations in the area of modeling household heterogeneity in recent years. Our goal in this paper is to demonstrate how recognizing household heterogeneity can potentially translate into more profitable marketing decisions. We accomplish this goal by showing how a retailer's pricing policy is inextricably related to household heterogeneity in reference effects, price response, and brand preference.
We show that the normative pricing policies based upon individual level estimates are quite different from those based on aggregate estimates that ignore heterogeneity. In the empirical results reported, although at the aggregate level both gain and loss estimates are about equal in magnitude, the impact of gain is greater for a significant number of customers. Our results show that incorporating heterogeneity results in a pricing policy that is qualitatively different and more profitable.
In the paper we develop normative pricing implications from the perspective of a retailer managing multiple brands. We find that the optimal pricing policy is closely related to the strength of brand preference. We show that from the standpoint of retailer profitability, the gain seeking households should have a high preference for a brand for price promotion to work. Our results therefore suggest the following. First, when there is heterogeneity among households with respect to reference effects (which is perhaps more common), i.e., some households are lossaverse and some are "gain-seeking", it is optimal for a retailer to promote those brands for which the preference is high among the gain-seeking households. Second, if the households are primarily "gain-seeking", price promotion for all brands is optimal. Third, if the households are mainly loss-averse, constant pricing policy for all brands is optimal.
The proposed model and the following analyses could be easily extended in several directions. For example, factors such as feature and display could be incorporated in equation (3). A variable to capture brand loyalty (Guadagni and Little 1983) could also be included.
Further, heterogeneity in reference prices could be captured by estimating a household specific exponential smoothing parameter in equation (6).
The paper also opens several avenues for future research. First, it may be worthwhile to develop a demographic profile of the "gain seeking" households in order to target them with physical/electronic coupons, mail-in rebates etc. Second, the proposed model is conditional on store choice. This condition could be relaxed to incorporate store competition. Third, the retailer objective is assumed to maximize category profits. The objective function could be extended to multiple categories or a basket of goods. Finally, in this paper we do not incorporate the role of brand manufacturers who are also likely to impact retailer pricing. A more comprehensive model (e.g. Kopalle et al. 1999 ) could be developed to capture the retailer-manufacturer dynamics. This paper takes a first step by examining the influence of household level heterogeneity in reference price effects on optimal retailer pricing policies. However, further research on characterizing such heterogeneity as well as incorporating competitive elements is clearly warranted.
θ is then given by:
where θ ∆ is a draw from a candidate generating density Normal(0,0.005). The choice for parameters of this density ensures an acceptance rate of over 50%. The probability of move α is given by:
Generate T:
where d 0 and D 0 are the prior degrees of freedom and sum of squares for T. 
